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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political, economic, and social 
relationships between China and Japan following the formal normalization of 
these relations in 1972 and subsequent decay during the past decade. Current 
issues such as Japan's foiled U.N. Security Council bid, underwater drilling rights, 
Taiwan, and growing nationalism within both countries are discussed. The 
primary findings in this paper argue that Sino-Japanese relations are in a 
precarious state and can be repaired only if Japan issues an all-encompassing 
formal reparation for the actions of its imperial army on its Asian neighbors during 
the 1930s and 1940s. After this last obstacle has been eradicated, China will 
finally fully embrace the possibility of an enhanced and mutually beneficial Sino-
Japanese relationship. 
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Sino-Japanese Relations since the 1972 Normalization: 
Prospects for Conflict Resolution and Regional Hegemony 
In the past decade, the diplomatic relationship between China and Japan has 
been increasingly agitated by controversies initiated by both sides in an indirect 
race for regional hegemony in Asia. While major conflict has been avoided so far, 
if both nations continue to neglect the causes of these issues of dispute, the region 
could find itself in dire straights in the coming decades. While at times they 
cooperate and a shared occupancy of the seat of power on the Asian stage seems 
plausible, as was especially true in the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship between 
the two nations has recently become more fragile due to conflicts ranging from the 
future of Taiwan to emerging strong nationalistic sentiments in both countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical, economical, and political 
events and issues that have affected Sino-Japanese relations since the 
normalization of relations in 1972, and to analyze these effects on current and 
future interaction. 
Historical Background of Normalization 
In 1931 the Japanese occupied Manchuria, the first of their many conquests 
in Asia. By 1937, the Japanese imperial army had overpowered much of China 
including Chahar, Hopeh, Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking. Most infamous of 
these invasions was the capture of Nanking. After seizure of the city in December 
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1937, the Japanese army began a massacre of the population which included 
civilian men, women, and children. Estimates of the death toll range from 
250,000 to 350,000 persons (Chang, 1997). This number far exceeds the 
casualties sustained in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima combined. In addition to 
execution, there was widespread torture and rape of the Chinese civilians during 
the weeks of the massacre. During Japan's 15-year military occupation of 
various Asian countries, an estimated 10-30 million people including POWs and 
forced laborers, died of a myriad of causes ranging from execution to starvation 
(Chang, 1997). 
Another major atrocity by Japan against its Asian neighbors involves the 
imperial military's use of sex slaves, commonly referred to as comfort women, 
during the occupation. Approximately 200,000 women from countries such as 
China, Philippines, Malaysia, and Korea, were manipulated or kidnapped by the 
Japanese and forcibly raped countless times (Brook, 2001). After the Japanese 
surrender during WWII, many of these women were killed or abandoned and 
subsequently died of starvation. The experiences of the surviving women were 
almost entirely overlooked by historians until the 1990s when some women began 
to come forward with their stories (Brook, 2001). In the years following WWII, 
relations between Japan and China were almost nonexistent. 
In the early 1970s, several developed nations began endeavors to establish 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in Beijing. On February 
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21, 1972 US President Richard Nixon embarked on his weeklong "ice-breaking" 
visit to the PRC ("Backgrounder," 2002). Japan quickly followed suit that same 
year by sending Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to China to discuss terms of 
normalization with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai (Kawashima, 2003). The 
fruits of this historic meeting were manifested in the September 29 signing of the 
1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement which officially normalized Sino-Japanese 
relations (Kim, 1975). The statement also made provisions for the eventual 
signing of an official peace treaty between China and Japan (Kawashima, 2003). 
At this time, Japan "expressed regret for the sufferings inflicted on China 
before 1945" (Beasley, 2000, p. 241). China, in tum, relinquished "any claim to 
a war indemnity" (Beasley, 2000, p. 242). China's conditions for the Sino-
Japanese reconciliation also called for the "recognition of the People's Republic as 
the sole legal government of China, acceptance of Taiwan as an inalienable part of 
the territory of the People's Republic, and abrogation of Japan's peace treaty with 
the Nationalists" (Hsiao, 1974, p. 721). As a result, any formal recognition or 
contract by Japan in regard to Taiwan as an entity separate from China was 
deemed null. 
Following the formal normalization of relations, the remainder of Sino-
Japanese relations throughout the 1970s was focused on cultivating trade between 
the two nations as well as developing bilateral administrative arrangements which 
dealt with a variety of issues such as civil aviation and fisheries (Kim, 1975). In 
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August of 1978, after years of negotiations and the death of Mao Tse-tung, an 
official peace treaty, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, was 
approved. Most of the negotiations concerning the treaty dealt with China's 
insistence on including an anti-hegemony clause. Japan was wary of such 
inclusion because of the implications it would have on relations with Moscow, 
who would no doubt interpret it as being directed toward the Soviet Union. 
However a compromise was made after both parties agreed on a diluted version of 
the anti-hegemony clause (Kim, 1975). 
This treaty and similar agreements between the two countries made at this 
time were ambitious in their provisions for a strong and prosperous China/Japan 
relationship. For example, a six-year trade agreement signed in February of 1978 
made provisions for impressive exchanges of Chinese oil and Japanese machinery. 
However, China eventually failed to meet the lofty petroleum quotas (Wang, 
1993). This pattern of initial high-ceiling expectations and later disappointment 
can be transposed from the trade sector to diplomatic bilateral relations on the 
whole from the honeymoon of normalization in the 1970s and 1980s and 
subsequent breakdown during the 1990s. 
Nature of Relationship during the 1980s 
The 1980s were marked by amplification of bilateral contact between the 
two nations. Although not at the astronomical rate initially predicted in the 
1970s, trade boomed. While bilateral trade was just over a billion dollars in the 
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early 1970s, in 1981 it had reached almost ten billion (Wang, 1993). By the early 
1980s, Japan was China's largest source of credit, contributing almost fifteen 
billion US dollars. Trade during this time also became diversified from the initial 
patterns of Chinese raw energy for Japanese machinery (Wang 1993). 
Fluctuating Public Opinion within China and Japan 
Many people, although not blind to the past, were optimistic about the 
future of the increasingly interconnected nations. They viewed the formal 
normalization of 1972 as the first step of a close relationship between the Asian 
nations. Some scholars even proposed the formation of a bond like the one shared 
by Germany and France. Various public opinion polls in both countries illustrate 
the attitudes of the masses in the two nations. While in 1980, 79% of Japanese 
polled harbored friendly feelings toward China, after the June 1989 Tiananmen 
Square catastrophe during which student protestors were violently suppressed 
under orders from the Chinese government, 40% of Japanese responded that they 
now looked upon their Asian neighbor in an unfriendly manner (Kawashima, 
2003). 
Trends in Relations during the 1990s 
Public opinion continued a downward spiral throughout the 1990s. The 
highpoint of relations during this period probably came during Emperor Akihito's 
1992 visit to China. Events such as the renegotiation of Japan's US security 
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alliance and China's ambitious forays into Japanese territory fed the fires of 
resentment between the two nations. 
Although diplomatic relations between the nations often seemed to be 
strained during the 1990s, trade relations continued to skyrocket, becoming five 
times larger during the decade (Kawashima, 2003). 
China's Growing Economy and Status (1970-Present) 
When evaluating the fluctuating relationship between China and Japan 
since normalization, it is vital that one examine the extreme economic, political, 
and ideological changes experienced by the two nations over the past three 
decades. China's incredible economic explosion is incredibly significant and 
merits consideration in any discussion of Sino-Japanese relations. 
From 1979 until 2003, China's economy experienced an average annual 
growth rate of 8-9% (Wang, 2005). Their foreign trade has surged past the one 
trillion dollar mark; their biggest trading partners being Japan and the United 
States. Foreign direct investment (FDI) also boomed; between 1985-90 it 
increased an average of30 per cent annually ("The Chinese Economy," 1992). 
Comparisons can even be drawn between "the pattern of consumption in China 
during 1985-1990 with that of Japan in 1955-1960"("The Chinese Economy," 
1992. p. 498). During the mid-1990s, growth slowed slightly as the Chinese 
government sought to take preventative measures against inflation ("The Chinese 
Economy," 1992). Although China did experience remarkable achievements 
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during the past two decades, that progress was not wrought without sacrifices. 
Critics suggest that economic and social security, income equality and the quality 
of the environment have all been casualties of post-1978 reforms Chinese 
economic development as a whole exploded during the 1980s and 1990s, however 
it should be noted that it was irregular and sporadic, and has left scars on the 
modem day PRC ("The Chinese Economy," 1992). 
Nationalistic Trends in Asia during Past Decade 
Within the past decade, recent trends, most notably towards nationalism, 
have been sweeping Asia. The motivation behind this move towards the 
unification of the population is often a direct result of opposition to a neighboring 
country. For example, large groups of Chinese have drawn together and 
trumpeted their national identity when they found a common transgressor in the 
form of a Japanese action or event. The April 2005 protests and vandalizing of 
Japanese-owned property attest to that phenomenon (Jennings, 2005). 
The decline of the Soviet Union left a conspicuous void in Asia; one that 
both Japan and China seem intent on filling. While some naively speculated that 
the two powers would cooperate and jointly become the major leaders of the 
region, in reality they have been butting heads, both trying to out-muscle the other 
in a quest for control. 
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Recent Growth of Nationalism within China 
As China continues to blossom, the motivating ideology of its people and 
government is continuously adapting itself. China's middle class is emerging and 
defining itself while the participation by capitalists in the government is changing 
the philosophy of the nation. Nationalism has increasingly replaced communism; a 
trend which is being nervously monitored by the administration in Beijing ("Wen 
Seeking," 2002). This new nationalism is evident in the bolder foreign policy of 
China that has been surfacing over the past decade (Wang, 2005). Many cite 
former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's pursuit of a "patriotic education" for 
China that more or less translated as anti-Japanese sentiments ("Wen Seeking," 
2002). Critics accuse China of nurturing anti-Japanese sentiment to stifle and 
prevent anti-government protests. Nationalism has been recently boosted even 
more by China's successful 2008 Olympic bid. As previously mentioned, 
nationalistic sentiment was also visible during the protests against Japan in April 
(Jennings, 2005). 
Trends Toward Nationalism in Japan 
These new nationalistic sentiments are not unique to China. Japan too, in 
the past decade has experienced a revival of nationalism. Chief Asia 
correspondent for London's Financial Times, Victor Mallet, observes: 
The newly assertive mood - expressed in films and manga comic books as 
well as in a directive from the Tokyo Board of Education requiring teachers 
to stand in front of the Rising Sun flag at school ceremonies and sing the 
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imperial national anthem - has worsened Japan's relations with the rest of 
Asia. (p. 17) 
Fueling the fire, Koizumi made yet another visit to the controversial 
Yasukuni shrine in October 2005. Since Koizumi announced that he has no 
intentions of seeking another term as prime minister after his expires in September 
2006, there has been much speculation over who will succeed him. Shinzo Abe, 
currently cited as the most popular potential candidate, is staunchly nationalistic, 
as is Taro Aso, another likely candidate ("Koizumi's Last," 2005). The popularity 
of these candidates among the Japanese is a testament to the general public's 
support and attitudes concerning a revival in nationalism for Japan. 
State of Present Sino-Japanese Relations 
Several recent events seem aimed to move Japan from a constitutionally-
pacifist nation to what Prime Minister Koizumi calls a "normal country," capable 
of a more "international role for Tokyo and the revision ofthe pacifist 
Constitution to acknowledge the country's considerable armed forces" (Sieff, 
2005). Many Japanese leaders' latest stances and actions concerning issues 
including Japan's Self Defense Forces, the Taiwan issue, ODA reform, and 
controversies dealing with Japan's wartime past have triggered intense reactions 
from China and other Asian neighbors. 
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Remilitarization of Japan 
In late October 2005, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee 
made up of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono, and 
Japanese Foreign Minitster Nobutaka Machimura, announced an agreement which 
will increase the cooperation between U.S. forces and Japanese Self Defense 
Forces. Ono called this arrangement a "historic process" and declared that the 
"Japanese government was ready to expand the Japanese Self Defense Forces' role 
to engage in joint defense activities with U. S. forces" (Sieff, 2005). An example 
of the possibilities of such joint defense projects would be using Japanese-
generated radar information to discharge interceptor missiles from U.S. destroyers. 
"Concrete implementation schedules" for the joint activities will completed by 
March 2006 (Sieff, 2005). 
These developments, which increase the participation of the Japanese in 
missile defense systems in Asia, continue the trend of raising eyebrows in regard 
to the Japanese Constitution, in particular Article 9. Also referred to as the peace 
clause, Article 9 prohibits Japan from participating in "collective self-defense" 
(Alford, 2005). Additionally, the U.S. and Japan also reached an agreement 
reducing the number of U.S. marines stationed in Japan from 14,500 to 7,500 over 
the course of six years. Much ofthe personnel will be relocated to the U.S. 
territory of Guam (Alford, 2005). 
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Japan is pursuing development of its own ballistic military defense (BMD) 
system. Aware of China's apprehension of such capabilities, Japanese officials 
generally favor the term BMD over theater missile defense (TMD) systems which 
carry a connotation of regional use as opposed to strictly defense. In regard to 
Chinese criticism, Japan is also quick to clarify that any BMD system is 
exclusively for Japan's protection, and will not be used in the event of disputes 
between the PRC and Taiwan (Mochizuki, 2001). The "defensive nature" of 
BMD is well-suited to Japan and is less liable to incite an arms race with China 
(Arase, 2001, p. 6). 
Implications of Taiwan on Sino-Japanese Relations 
Since 1996, missiles have been deployed from China toward Taiwan's 
southeast coastline. Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian estimates over 700 such 
tests have been carried out, with almost 100 being conducted annually in recent 
years (Reilly, 2005) Amphibious military drills by the Chinese have also 
occurred in the region, fueling speculation that an invasion of Taiwan by the 
Chinese is imminent (Reilly, 2005). This October 2005 marks the 60th anniversary 
of Taiwan's return to China after being held by Japan for 50 years. In an unusual 
move, Beijing held massive celebrations marking this anniversary. However the 
festivities and parades masked a covert message to Taiwan from the mainland: 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRe. This message echoed the sentiment 
expressed in the passing of the Anti-secession Law in March 2005 (Ahmed, 2005). 
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This legislation pre-approved non-peaceful measures to be taken if Taiwan 
formally moved towards independence. Although the anniversary celebrations 
were directed towards Taiwan, the traces of anti-Japanese sentiment in mainland 
China associated with the events leading up to the return of the country in 1945 
were evident (Ahmed, 2005). 
During the past decades, Japan maintained a vague policy about its actions 
in the event of Taiwan taking further steps towards independence. At the time of 
normalization, Japan formally recognized Beijing as the only government; since 
then any relations with the Taiwanese government have been through unofficial 
intermediaries (Kawashima, 2003). Japan's close relationship with the United 
States indirectly implicates it with the United State's actions in regard to Taiwan. 
Beijing is all-too aware of the role Japan would play if the United States were to 
physically support a move by Taiwan toward full independence. 
Status of Japanese ODA to China 
Japan's financial aid to China in the form of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is another recent area of conflict. When relations between the 
two nations were normalized in 1972, China decided to forego any demands for 
reparations from Japan in lieu of receiving economic assistance (Wang, 1993). 
Since 1972, Japan has been China's largest supplier ofODA in the form oflow-
interest loans, grants, etc. Japan's total aid to China exceeds 33 billion dollars 
("Japan minister," 2005). 
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The recent concerns Japan has voiced to China concerning ODA deal with 
three major issues. First, the very existence of ODA originating in Japan is rarely 
publicized in China. Consequently, the majority of the people are not aware of 
their neighbor nation's contribution, and are therefore deemed ungrateful by the 
Japanese ("Japan minister," 2005). Another note of discord pertains to China's 
own ODA contributions to other countries. Japan reasons that if China can offer 
assistance to other nations, current aid into China is unnecessary ("It's time to 
end," 2004). Last, Japan has expressed disapproval of China's recent ballooning 
military and defense expenditures, as well as the general opacity of China's 
budgets. Although China's military budget is cited as only 20% of that of the 
United States', Japanese public opinion is suspicious of the recent increases and 
questions its own financial contributions China (Mazzetti, 2005). Japanese 
Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura announced in March 2005 that ODA to 
China in the form of low-interest rate yen loans would cease in 2008 ("Japan 
minister," 2005). 
Controversial Interpretations of History 
Several other current issues of debate between the two countries also have 
roots in early and mid-twentieth century history. The horrendous acts of violence 
committed by Japanese troops on the Chinese in the 1940s is frequently recapped 
by Beijing in modem Sino-Japanese discourse. These wounds have not been 
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opened by China indiscriminately though. Several episodes initiated by Japan 
have served as catalysts for reopening heated discussion of the past. 
Yasukuni Shrine Debate 
The October 2005 visit to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo marked the fifth 
time that Prime Minister Koizumi has made the trip to the memorial which honors 
Japan's 2.5 million war casualties as well as 14 class-A war criminals (Yuan, 
2005). Especially controversial is the Yasukuni museum's stance on the massacre 
at Nanjing. "Residents were once again able to live their lives in peace." the 
exhibit says of the effects of Japanese actions in the region (Onishi, 2005, p. A4). 
To the chagrin of Asian neighbors, most notably China and South Korea, 
Koizumi's repeated formal visits to Yasukuni in the capacity of the nation's 
leader, serve as pep rallies for the growing nationalistic sentiments in Japan. As 
issues of controversy between Japan and China become more numerous and well-
publicized, peoples' ways of viewing themselves and the opposing country are 
gaining teeth. 
Nationalist Japanese Textbooks Controversy 
In addition to the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni, other events related 
to Japan's militaristic past have been constant stumbling blocks in relations 
between Japan and China during the past few years. For example, after junior 
high and high school textbooks produced by the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reform were approved for use by the Japanese education ministry in 
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April 2005, China and South Korea both protested loudly. They claim that the 
books, controversial within Japan as well, were overly nationalistic, ignoring 
Japan's militaristic past and wrongs against its Asian neighbors. Critics lament 
the textbook's dearth of entries dealing with subjects such as wartime sex slavery 
and the Nanjing massacre ("China says," 2005). 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao claim that adoption of 
these books by Japanese school systems will, "inevitably mislead and poison 
teenagers"("China says," 2005). Following the endorsement of the books by the 
Japanese government in April, large protests were staged in China, ending with the 
vandalizing of Japanese-owned businesses in China. Protestors also threw rocks 
and debris at the Japanese embassy; the Chinese police on hand made no attempt 
to stop the destructive demonstrations. Although the Chinese government 
eventually banned such protests, the dawdling pace of Beijing's reaction was 
heavily criticized by Tokyo (Jennings, 2005). "Strong responses from the Asian 
people should make the Japanese government renect deeply and profoundly," 
Chinese Premier Wen instead said in the days immediately following the protests 
("Wen Seeking," 2005). 
Japan's U.N. Security Council Bid 
Another point of dissension between the two nations is Japan's thwarted 
bid for a permanent U.N. Security Council seat. Leading the opposition to this 
bid, China, a permanent member of the council, played the history card, 
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passionately reviving memories of Japan's aggression throughout Asia in the mid-
twentieth century ("Wen Seeking," 2005). Only three Asian nations, Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and Maldives, supported Japan's bid. As a result, Japan has seemingly 
lost any chance of obtaining the seat, and public opinion of the U.N. and China 
within Japan has plummeted. In October Japan's ambassador to the U.N., Toshiro 
Ozawa, issued a statement in regard to Japan's mounting frustration with the 
international organization, "Japan is obligated to pay an assessed contribution that 
far exceeds the sum of the contributions made by four out of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council"(Kakuchi, 2005). Former head of the United 
Nations University in Tokyo, Professor Takeshi Inoguchi, predicts that as Japan 
prepares its budget for the coming years, the dues paid to the United Nations will 
be reduced by as much as ten percent. Japanese frustration with the United 
Nations appears to be rooted in deep resentment of China's role in sabotaging the 
security seat bid. 
East China Sea Oil Conflict 
Another major area of international discrepancy lies at the bottom of the 
East China Sea. Rich oil and gas deposits have been claimed by both Japan and 
China. According to Japan, the deposits overlap the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) of both countries. However, China recognizes different EEZ borders, and 
thus argues that the area is neutral. Therefore the Chinese deem it open to 
exploitation, and are currently drilling in the disputed area. ("Oil and Gas," 2005). 
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While several rounds of talks have been held, no progress has been made. 
Sentiments have been agitated by the staunch military presence China has 
dispatched to monitor the area. In late October, another round of talks was 
cancelled by China in response to Koizumi's most recent shrine visit. 
It seems that the conflict over the natural gas and oil fields comes down to 
pride on the parts of both nations. Although the "supposed 7 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas and close to 100 billion barrels of oil" (Hall, 2005, p. 58) is an 
attractive lure, transportation of the resources back to Japan is difficult, and 
interested companies might be hard to come by, especially if there is a significant 
risk of damaging international relations. 
Conclusions 
With so many potential catalysts hovering in the horizon of Sino-Japanese 
international relations, is it just a matter of time before these wars of words 
escalate into serious military or economic conflict? China must contend with the 
daunting military alliance between Japan and the United States; any action against 
Japan would provoke an undesirable response from across the Pacific. Japan must 
also weigh its options carefully, are both the government and people prepared to 
finally stand up against China'? 
China has recently surpassed the United States as Japan's largest trading 
partner. While the entrenched economic interdependency of the two nations will 
likely prevent complete breakdown of relations or perhaps even war, the inability 
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of either side to commit completely to the resolution of the disagreements 
discussed in this paper is detrimental to the entire region's growth. 
As a Japanese-American descendent of American WWII internees, I am 
especially interested in Japan's reaction to the region's demands for reparation. 
While it may be too late for Japan to follow Germany's footsteps of steep tinancial 
compensation, I believe that for the sake of regional concord, Japan should thicken 
its verbal apologies into something tangible to satiate the anti-Japanese dogma of 
China. Only after this issue is settled will the playing table be evened and 
negotiations made possible without the ominous history card resurfacing again. 
I believe that Japan has been reluctant to make such reparations due to the 
general lack of guilt felt by the population. Many Japanese see themselves as 
victims of WWII, reinforcing that claim with memories of the victims of Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima. The youth especially, often misinfonned as to the imperialist past 
of Japan, see reparations as unnecessary and detrimental to the nationalistic trends 
of modern Japan. Japanese point to the massive ODA contributions and maintain 
that enough has already been done to help the Chinese. Popular Japanese 
sentiment is that any further apologies or financial amends will only weaken Japan 
in the eyes of its Asian neighbors. In my opinion, Japan should swallow its pride, 
and strive to summon a tinal, all-encompassing. and perhaps financially backed, 
admission of guilt, thereby eliminating the roadblock to Asian cooperation. 
Sino-Japanese Relations 21 
Perhaps after this conciliatory move by Japan, China will dilute its opaque fa<;ade 
and work for a close, mutually-beneficial relationship with its neighbor . 
• 
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